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What is polytheism?
“Monotheism” and “polytheism” are recent words, not older than the 17th 
century ce, and they have different statuses. Monotheism is a general term for 
religions that confess to and worship only one god. “One God!” (Heis Tbeos) 
or “No other gods!” (first commandment)—these are the central mottos of 
monotheism. The religions subsumed under the term polytheism cannot, how­
ever, be reduced to a single motto of opposite meaning, such as “Many gods!” 
or “No exclusion of other gods!” On the contrary, the unity or oneness of 
the divine is an important topic in Egyptian, Babylonian, Indian, Greek, and 
other polytheistic traditions. Polytheism is simply a less polemical substitute 
for what monotheistic traditions formerly called “idolatry” and “paganism” 
(Hebrew ‘aboda zara, Arabic shirk or jahiliya). Whereas monotheism consti­
tutes a self-description of religions subsumed under that term, no such self­
description exists for polytheistic religions. Monotheism asserts its identity by 
opposing itself to polytheism, whereas no polytheistic religion ever asserted it­
self in contradistinction to monotheism, for the simple reason that polytheism 
is always the older or “primary” and monotheism the newer or “secondary” 
type of religion. Monotheism is self-description, polytheism is construction 
of the other. However, although polytheistic religions include a concept of di­
vine unity, these religions undoubtedly do worship a plethora of gods, which 
justifies applying a word built on the element poly (many) to them. Unity in 
this case does not mean the exclusive worship of one god, but the structure and 
coherence of the divine world, which is not just an accumulation of deities, but 
a structured whole, a pantheon.
Theologia tripertita
The most cogent theory of polytheism comes from an ancient author. Varro’s 
concept of a “tripartite theology” refers to a general structure that is perfectly
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well applicable not only to the Roman and Greek religions that Varro had 
in mind, but also to ancient Egyptian and Babylonian religions. These reli­
gions know three spheres or dimensions of divine presence and religious expe­
rience, which closely correspond to Varro’s three theologies, showing that 
we are dealing here with a rather general structure of polytheism. His theologia 
naturalis (Greek theologia kosmike, cosmic theology) corresponds to the cos­
mic dimension of divine manifestation; his theologia civilis (Greek theologia 
politike, political theology) corresponds to the cultic dimension; and his theo­
logia fabularis (Greek theologia myth ike, mythical or narrative theology) cor­
responds to the dimension of historia divina, the stories about the gods, their 
names, epithets, and genealogies (Antiquitates rerum divinarum, frags. 6-10 
Cardauns; see also Deities and Demons).
Cosmos. The first dimension of divine presence or manifestation is the cos­
mos or nature. Polytheistic cosmology views the cosmos as a cooperative pro­
cess: the deities cooperate in creating and maintaining the world. In Egypt, the 
sun-god and his daily course across the sky and the underworld beneath the 
earth form the center of this processual cosmology. In Babylonia and Greece, 
the gods seem to be less involved in maintaining the cosmic process and freer to 
intervene in human affairs. There, the aspect of unity and coherence is ex­
pressed above all in social and political terms, especially in the model of a royal 
court. However, the idea of a highest god who rules as a king over the world of 
gods is common to all polytheisms of the ancient world. Political philosopher 
Eric Voegelin has coined the term Summo-Deism in order to emphasize the hi­
erarchical structure of polytheism. Typically, the highest god is also the creator 
(Marduk in Babylonia; Re, later Amun-Re, in Egypt; although in Greece and 
Rome, according to the best-known cosmologies, neither Zeus/Jupiter nor any 
other god creates the world; it simply develops out of Chaos on its own).
In Egypt, the highest god combines the aspects of creator, sun, and king. 
Here, the idea of unity seems most prominent. Before the monotheistic 
revolution of Akhenaten, however, the fundamental plurality of the divine 
world in its cosmic manifestation was never questioned. The cosmic process 
was viewed as an interplay of convergent and divergent powers. Two other­
wise antagonistic powers, Horus, the god of royal legitimacy, and Seth, the god 
of anarchic violence and force, cooperated in defending the sun-god against 
Apopis, a water-dragon personifying chaos. The order must always be de­
fended against a gravitation toward disorder or entropy. Order is time or 
movement, and it would come to an immediate standstill if the foe were de­
finitely annihilated once and for all.
In the eyes of the Egyptians, the success of the cosmic process was always at 
risk. In the same way as the Mesopotamians, the Chinese, and the Romans, 
Egyptians were constantly occupied in watching the sky and in observing all 
kinds of natural phenomena with the greatest attention. But whereas in Meso­
potamia, China, and Rome this attention was associated with various forms of 
divination that served to reveal the will of the gods and to foretell the future, in 
Egypt it was connected with the daily ritual that served to assist the gods in
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maintaining the world, supplementing divine action with ritual action. Thus, 
the Egyptians observed the regular and the recurrent, whereas cultures that fo­
cused on divination observed the exceptional and deviant. In the context of 
this task and their intellectual preoccupation with it, the Egyptians accumu­
lated an incredible amount of knowledge, a kind of sacred cosmology, whereas 
the Sumerians and Babylonians, in the context of their preoccupation with div­
ination, accumulated a similar mass of omen literature, which established con­
nections between divine signs and historical or biographical events.
The cosmic dimension provides evidence of the gods through the natural 
world and its phenomena. Nobody would dream of denying the existence of 
the divine powers: they are overwhelmingly present in the shape of sun and 
moon; air, water, fire, and earth; life and death; war and peace; and so on. It is 
possible to neglect them, to break one of their specific taboos, to miss the cor­
rect performance of their rites, but it is impossible to either enter or leave a re­
lationship which is always already established, into which we are born, and 
which is never the matter of a personal decision.
Cult and political organization. The second dimension consists of the vari­
ous forms of terrestrial governance in which the gods of a polytheistic pan­
theon typically participate. The more important deities of a pantheon are 
“town-gods,” and the more important urban centers of a country are a god’s 
cities in the sense that they are strongly associated with the name of a deity 
whose temple is the chief temple of that town: Marduk and Babylon, Assur 
and the city Assur, Athena and Athens, Ptah and Memphis, and so on. The 
pantheon is an assembly of town lords and temple owners, headed, in some 
cases, by a god whose temple is in the capital and who, for this reason, rules 
not only his city but the whole country (e.g., Marduk and Babylon) or, in other 
cases, who has important cults in virtually every city, even if the city worships 
another divinity as its own (e.g., Zeus is prominent even in Athens). Aspects 
both of unity and of diversity are prominent in the political and geographical 
dimensions of godhead as well. The aspect of unity can be represented by the 
unity of a country and its hierarchical structure of center and periphery (as in 
Egypt) or by the periodic gathering together of different towns’ citizens at cen­
tralized cult places such as Olympia (as in Greece), whereas the aspect of diver­
sity finds its expression in the specific identity and profile of the individual 
towns and regions.
The political dimension of the divine world may also be called cultic, be­
cause it is in their function as town lords and ladies that the deities receive 
cultic worship. The cult is the service that a lord or lady requires and resembles 
in many respects a royal ceremonial. The feasts are typically celebrated in the 
form of a procession and have the clear political meaning of territorial owner­
ship and its annual confirmation.
Myth. The third dimension may be called the personal or biographical as­
pect of the divine world. In a polytheistic religion, a deity cannot be spoken 
about without reference to other deities. The gods live, act, and display their 
personalities and characters in interaction, not only or even primarily with
19
ENCOUNTERING ANCIENT RELIGIONS
humans, but with one another, in relation to other gods, in “constellations” 
that find their expression in myths, genealogies, epithets, names—in short, in 
everything that can be said about a deity. Divine constellations reflect the 
fundamental order and elementary structure of human society—husband and 
wife, brother and sister, mother and son, mother and daughter, father and son, 
father and daughter, lover and beloved, lord and slave, hero and enemy, and 
so on. These constellations unfold in stories (myths) of equally fundamental 
character, founding and modeling the basic structures of human life, institu­
tions, hopes, and experience: love and death, war and peace, identity and 
transformation, suffering and salvation. The relation between the divine and 
the human world is anthropomorphic rather than anthropocentric. The natu­
ral partner of a deity is another deity, not humanity. The gods of a polytheistic 
pantheon care above all for themselves, in the second place for their cities and 
their followers, and only exceptionally for humankind at large. But this rela­
tive distance between the divine and the human worlds is compensated for by 
intense analogy and a relationship of mutual modeling. The structures of the 
divine world and the stories about the gods reflect the fundamentals of human 
existence, but they function as models, and not as mirrors. The gods live and 
die, rule and serve, suffer and enjoy, win and are defeated: they set the norms 
and forms of human life, which repeats and reflects the timeless models and 
follows the traces of historia divina.
The “theologization” of history:
Anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism
The tripartite structure of polytheism establishes a rather indirect relation be­
tween gods and humans. The sphere of direct encounters and interventions, 
which plays such an important role in Greek, Roman, and Babylonian mythol­
ogy, seems to be missing. How shall we account for the widespread belief that 
illness and misfortune are expressions of divine wrath and that the gods inter­
vene in various forms in human affairs? There seems to be a fourth dimension 
of divine manifestation and religious experience, which comprises human life 
and history.
In Egypt, we actually observe the emergence of history as a fourth parameter 
or dimension of the divine world, starting with the 18th Dynasty and gaining 
predominance in the Ramesside age (ca. 1300-1100 bce). With the emergence 
of the dimension of history, the relationship between the divine and the human 
worlds changes from anthropomorphism to anthropocentrism. The gods not 
only maintain the cosmic process, not only dwell and rule on earth in their 
temples, and are not only involved in stories that take place in their own sphere 
among the gods—they also determine the course of human history on earth, 
the welfare of the state and the people; they do this by sending victories and de­
feats, health and illness, prosperity and disaster. In Egypt, this “theologization 
of history” is a new development. In Mesopotamia, however, as in Greece, 
Rome, and Bronze Age Anatolia, the religious meaning of history seems to
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have been a concept that was in place from the start. Gods supervise the obser­
vance of treaties and help to protect the integrity of their sanctuaries and cities. 
In Mesopotamia we also find the concept of a “personal god,” which brings 
the worlds of gods and humans into closer relationship, while at the same time 
preserving the principle of plurality and diversity. Each human being has a spe­
cific personal god among the lesser gods, who cares for him or her and inter­
cedes on his or her behalf with the greater gods.
Unlike Egypt, where any forms of historiography dealing with longer peri­
ods of the past are missing until the Greco-Roman period, Mesopotamia yields 
many royal inscriptions that narrate the entire extension of a reign and even 
texts that stretch back over a series of different reigns into the remote past. 
The Curse on Agade, for example, narrates the history of the rise and fall of 
the Sargonid Dynasty during the 2.3rd and 22nd centuries bce. Among other 
events it relates how King Naram-Sin destroyed the temple of Enlil in Nippur 
and how Enlil responded to this crime by sending forth the Guteans, who put 
an end to the Sargonid Empire. Similarly, the fall of the Empire of Ur is traced 
back, in another text, to certain transgressions committed by King Shulgi. The 
theological and juridical concept of religious guilt and divine punishment gives 
meaning to history and coherence to the chain of events and sequence of dy­
nasties. In Egypt, disaster is a manifestation of chaos and blind contingency. In 
Mesopotamia, however, it is read as the manifestation of the punishing will of 
a divinity whose anger has been stirred by the king. In yet other cultures, such 
as Greece, a disaster can be understood as preordained by fate (moira), al­
though fate’s decrees are often carried out by the gods. An event such as the 
Trojan War, therefore, which was viewed as historical by the Greeks, can be 
given meaning within a larger context of ongoing human culture.
The apex of the theologization of history is reached with biblical, especially 
Deuteronomistic, historiography (see Van Seters 1983). The idea of forming 
an alliance with God instead of only appointing certain deities as supervisors 
of political alliances draws God much more closely into the ups and downs of 
human affairs than had been the case in Mesopotamia and its neighboring civi­
lizations. There, history was just a field of possible interventions by the gods, 
favorable or punitive; now it turns into one coherent connection of events 
stretching from creation until the end of the world, a sequence known as 
bistoria sacra in the Judeo-Christian tradition.
However, the idea of divine verdict and intervention was not totally absent 
even in Egypt. On the contrary, the typically Egyptian idea of a judgment after 
death appears as the strongest possible manifestation of the principle of divine 
verdict. But the concept of postmortem human immortality provides a horizon 
of fulfillment beyond history, whereas in Mesopotamia and Israel, where the 
concept of human immortality is unknown, every account has to be settled on 
earth. Here, the horizon of fulfillment is confined to the terrestrial world, but 
stretched into the future, over generations and dynasties.
In Israel, this fourth dimension of theology tends to prevail over and, in the 
course of time, to replace the three others. With the rise of monotheism, the
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cosmos ceases to appear as a manifestation of divine presence and comes to be 
seen merely as the creation, the work of God. The geographical and cultic di­
mension is reduced, after the reform of King Josiah at the end of the 7th cen­
tury, to the temple at Jerusalem and no longer reflects the pluralistic identity 
of various centers and regions. Historia divina, the stories that are told about 
the gods and that display their characters and their vicissitudes, is turned into 
historia sacra, the story of the One God and his chosen people. Historia sacra 
is the successor of both the third or mythic dimension of narrative articu­
lation of divine constellations and the fourth dimension in the traditional 
Mesopotamian sense of divine intervention in human affairs. YHWH inter­
venes in human affairs not only occasionally; in entering the covenant with Is­
rael, concern with human affairs becomes YHWH’s dominant trait.
Historia sacra is a dimension of divine presence that excludes the principle 
of plurality. There can be but one lord of history, one divine partner in a story 
shared by god and humans. There are, however, surprising parallels to such an 
extremely anthropocentric conception of the divine even in Egypt. A passage in 
the Instruction for Merikare speaks of the ways that God cares for humans as 
his cattle or herd, in terms strongly reminiscent of biblical anthropocentrism:
Humans are well cared for, 
the livestock of god:
he made heaven and earth for their sake, 
he pushed the greediness of the waters back 
and created the air so that their nostrils might live.
His images are they, having come forth from his body.
For their sake he rises to heaven;
it is for them that he has made plants and animals,
birds and fish,
so that they might have food.
If he killed his enemies and went against his children, 
this was only because they thought of rebellion.
For their sake he causes there to be light.
To see them he travels [the heavens].
He established for himself a chapel at their back.
When they weep, he hears.
He created for them a ruler in the egg
and a commander to strengthen the backbone of the weak.
He made for them magic as a weapon 
to ward off the blow of fate, 
watching over them night and day.
He thrashed the cowardly among them,
as a man beats his son for the sake of his brother.
God knows every name.
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This is not only an extremely anthropocentric view of creation, it is also a 
monotheistic view of the divine. The text speaks of God; other gods are not 
mentioned. This kind of monotheism, however, is not a matter of religion, but 
of genre and perspective. If one looks at the world in the way that this text 
does, the principles of plurality and differentiation disappear, and the ultimate 
unity of the divine appears. This perspective is characteristic of the genre of 
wisdom literature, a forerunner of moral philosophy that reflects in a very gen­
eral way on the fundamentals of human existence. Egyptian wisdom litera­
ture generally speaks of god instead of specific gods. This is not only a generic 
term, to be filled in by a specific god as the case may be (a god instead of the 
god), but a specific term referring to the sun-god and creator, as in the Instruc­
tion of Merikare. In the perspective of moral philosophy, this is the only god 
that really counts, the one god on which everything else (including the other 
gods) depends. Such a “monotheism of perspective” is conventionally termed 
henotheism to distinguish it from monolatry as a monotheism of cult, worship, 
and commitment, whereas the term monotheism is reserved for a combination 
of both: the transformation of a henotheistic perspective into a full-fledged reli­
gion or vice versa, the transformation of a monolatrous cult (which recognizes 
the existence of other gods but worships only one) into a religion adopting the 
henotheistic perspective in which the other gods do not exist at all.
In Egypt, the henotheistic perspective of wisdom literature and the polythe­
ism of cult coexist without any apparent conflict. During the New Kingdom, 
however, the henotheistic perspective starts to affect certain domains of temple 
literature as well, especially hymns to Amun-Re, the god of the capital, Thebes, 
who becomes identified with the sun-god of Heliopolis. An early hymn to this 
god, dating back perhaps even before the New Kingdom, adopts the anthropo­
centric and henotheistic perspective of Merikare:
Hail, Re, lord of justice,
whose chapel is hidden, lord of the gods,
Khepri in his boat,
at whose command the gods emerge,
Atum, creator of human beings,
who differentiates them and makes them live,
who distinguishes people by the color of their skin,
who hears the prayers of those in distress,
and is well disposed to those who call on him,
who rescues the fearful from the overbearing,
who judges between rich and poor,
lord of perception, on whose lips is the creative word,
it is for his sake that Hapi has come,
lord of sweetness, great of love,
it is to make people live that he has come.
To be sure, the gods, plural, are mentioned in this text, which is still a far 
cry from real monotheism and even henotheism. Yet the gods are put on a
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level with humans and every other creature, and the general view is clearly 
anthropocentric and henotheistic. Akhenaten’s monotheistic Amarna revolu­
tion is the radical consequence of this shift from mythical anthropomorphism 
to philosophical anthropocentrism. It realizes the henotheistic perspective in 
terms of cult and religious institutions, turning the sun- and creator-god into 
the sole and only one and denying the other gods any worship and even exis­
tence. In the aftermath of this revolutionary step, the gods are readmitted into 
cult and general worldview; the henotheistic perspective, however, still pre­
vails, and the gods tend now to be demoted, especially in hymns to Amun, to 
“names,” “manifestations,” “symbols,” “limbs,” and so on, of the One. This 
post-Amarna theology is closer to pantheism than to monotheism; however, 
the tripartite structure of divine presence—the cosmic, cubic, and mythic di­
mensions—is again fully expressed in the religious life of the country, and the 
new concept of a fourth dimension, history, does not in any way invalidate the 
importance of the other three.
What is monotheism?
Evolutionary monotheism
The idea of unity is not alien to polytheistic religions. On the contrary, the em­
phasis on the oneness or uniqueness of God or the ultimate unity of the divine 
world with its plethora of deities is obvious in Mesopotamian and Egyptian 
texts and increases over time.
Translating gods. In polytheistic religions, the deities are clearly differenti­
ated and personalized by name, shape, and function. The great achievement of 
polytheism is the articulation of a common semantic universe. It is this seman­
tic dimension that makes the names translatable—that is, makes it possible 
for gods from different cultures or parts of a culture to be equated with one 
another. Tribal religions are ethnocentric. The powers and ancestral spirits 
worshiped by one tribe are different from those worshiped by another tribe. 
In contrast, the highly differentiated members of polytheistic pantheons lend 
themselves easily to cross-cultural translation or “interpretation.” Translation 
functions because the names not only have a reference, but also a meaning, 
namely, the god’s specific character as it is unfolded in cosmological specula­
tion, myths, hymns, rites, and so on. This character makes a deity comparable 
to other deities with similar traits. The similarity of gods makes their names 
mutually translatable. But in historical reality, this correlation has to be re­
versed. The practice of translating the names of the gods created a concept of 
similarity and produced the idea or conviction that gods are international.
The tradition of translating or interpreting foreign divine names goes back 
to the innumerable glossaries equating Sumerian and Akkadian words, among 
which appear lists of divine names in two or even three languages, such as 
Emesal (women’s language, used as a literary dialect), Sumerian, and Akka­
dian. The most interesting of these sources is the explanatory list Anu sa ameli,
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which contains three columns, the first giving the Sumerian name, the sec­
ond the Akkadian name, and the third the functional definition of the deity. 
This explanatory list gives what may be called the meaning of divine names, 
making explicit the principle that underlies the equation or translation of di­
vine names. In the Kassite period of the Late Bronze Age, the lists are extended 
to include languages such as Amorite, Hurrian, Elamite, and Kassite in addi­
tion to Sumerian and Akkadian. In these cases, the practice of translating 
divine names was applied to very different cultures and religions. The origin 
of this practice may be identified in the field of international law. Treaties had 
to be sealed by solemn oaths, and the gods invoked in these oaths had to 
be recognized by both parties. The list of these gods conventionally closes 
the treaty. They necessarily had to be equivalent as to their function and in par­
ticular as to their rank. Intercultural theology became a concern of interna­
tional law.
The growing political and commercial interconnectedness of the ancient 
world and the practice of cross-cultural translation of everything, including di­
vine names, gradually led to the concept of a common religion. The names, ico­
nographies, and rites—in short, the cultures—differ, but the gods are the same. 
This concept of religion as the common background of cultural diversity and 
the principle of cultural translatability eventually led to the late Hellenistic 
mentality, for which the names of the gods mattered little in view of the over­
whelming natural evidence for their existence and presence in the world.
Hyphenating gods. Scholars conventionally refer to an Egyptian phenome­
non that might be compared to the Mesopotamian technique of translating 
gods as syncretism. It involves the collocation of two or three different gods, 
leading to hyphenated names such as Amun-Re, Amun-Re-Harakhty, Ptah- 
Sokar-Osiris, Hathor-Tefnut, Min-Horus, Atum-Khepri, Sobek-Re, and so on. 
As a rule, the first name refers to the cultic/local dimension, the actual temple 
owner and lord of the town, whereas the second name refers to a translocal, 
preferably cosmic deity. Thus, Amun is the lord of Thebes, in whom the sun- 
god, Re, becomes manifest. Ptah is the lord of Memphis, Sokar the god of its 
necropolis, Osiris the god of the underworld and the dead whose Memphite 
representation is to be seen in Ptah-Sokar. This relationship between deities 
does not mean equation or fusion; the gods retain their individuality. Re does 
not merge into Amun or vice versa. The gods enter into a relationship of mu­
tual determination and complementation: Re becomes the cosmic aspect of 
Amun, Amun the cubic and local aspect of Re; Atum refers to the nocturnal, 
and Khepri to the diurnal aspect of the sun-god. Hyphenation implies neither 
identification nor subordination; Amun has no precedence over Re, nor Re 
over Amun. In the course of time, however, this practice of “hyphenating” 
gods fosters the idea of a kind of deep structure identity.
A similar practice occurs in Greece, although with very different ramificat­
ions. A god worshiped throughout Greece, such as Artemis, may become asso­
ciated with a local god whose traits are similar (thus in Arcadia we find Arte­
mis Callisto). In these cases, however, an originally independent god—even a
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god who continues to be worshiped independently in some cases—is subordi­
nated to the Panhellenic god both in the sense that the lesser god’s altar is 
smaller than the greater god’s and in the sense that myth makes the lesser god a 
“heroic” companion of the greater god.
“All gods are One.’’ In Mesopotamia, the pantheon is structured by strong 
hierarchical relations of subordination, and this, in the long run, fosters similar 
ideas of deep structural identity. The creation epic, the Enuma Elish, ends with 
a hymn to the chief god, Marduk, calling him by fifty names. The gods who are 
subordinated to Marduk become his names, aspects of his all-encompassing es­
sence. Another text assembles a group of major deities, identifying them with 
roles of Marduk:
Ninirta is Marduk of the hoe,
Nergal is Marduk of the attack,
Zababa is Marduk of the hand-to-hand fight,
Enlil is Marduk of lordship and counsel,
Nabium is Marduk of accounting,
Sin is Marduk, the illuminator of the night,
Shamash is Marduk of justice,
Adad is Marduk of rains.
A hymn of Assurbanipal addresses Marduk as carrying the identity of the three 
highest gods as personal properties: “You hold the Anu-ship, the Enlil-ship, the 
Ea-ship.” The culmination of these tendencies is reached when the whole pan­
theon comes to be seen as just aspects of one supreme god. “All gods are 
three,” we read in an Egyptian text (Papyrus Leiden 1.350), which moreover 
states that these three gods are just aspects of one god:
All gods are three:
AMUN, RE, and PTAH, whom none equals.
He who hides his name as Amun, 
he appears to the face as Re, 
his body is PTAH.
We easily discern here the three “dimensions” of polytheistic theology: name, 
cosmic appearance, and cubic “embodiment” in a statue, dwelling in a temple, 
ruling a city. These three dimensions, however, are encompassed and tran­
scended by a god who is referred to as only “He.” Amun is just a name screen­
ing the true and hidden name of this god, of whom another hymn states:
People fall down immediately for fear
if his name is uttered knowingly or unknowingly.
There is no god able to call him by it.
In Egypt, this concept of a Supreme Being comprising in his essence the whole 
pantheon goes back to the Ramesside period (13th century bce) and seems to
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be a reaction to Akhenaten’s monotheistic revolution. It stresses the oneness of 
god while retaining the multiplicity of the divine. In the last instance, all gods 
are but One, the immanent manifold manifestation and diversification of a hid­
den and transcendent unity.
Hypsistos: belief in a Supreme Being. The idea that the various nations wor­
shiped basically the same deities but under different names and in different 
forms eventually led to the belief in a Supreme Being (the Greek expression is 
Hypsistos, the Highest One) comprising in its essence not only all the myriads 
of known and unknown deities, but above all those three or four gods who, in 
the context of different religions, play the role of the highest god (usually Zeus, 
Sarapis, Helios, and Iao = YHWH). This superdeity is addressed by appella­
tions such as Hypsistos (Supreme) and the widespread “One-God” predication 
Heis Theos. Oracles typically proclaim particular gods to be one and the same 
together with other gods:
One Zeus, one Hades, one Helios, one Dionysus,
One god in all gods.
Pseudo-Justin, Exhortation against the Greeks 15 = Orphic frag. 239 (Macrobius, 
Saturnalia 1.18.17 quotes the first verse)
In one of these oracles, Iao, the god of the Jews, is proclaimed to be the god of 
time (Olam-Aion), appearing as Hades in winter, Zeus in springtime, Helios 
in summer, and “Habros Iao” in autumn. (Macrobius, Saturnalia 1.18.20; see 
Peterson 1926: 243-44; Hengel 1969: 476-77; and the inscription Heis Zeus 
Serapis lad [CIL 2 suppl. 5665 = Dunand 1975: 170]). These oracles and 
predications manifest a quest for the sole and supreme divine principle be­
yond the innumerable multitude of specific deities. This is typical of the “ecu­
menical age” and seems to correspond to efforts toward political unification 
(see Peterson 1935, 1951; Schindler 1978; Momigliano 1987; Dunand 1975; 
and Fowden 1993). The belief in the Supreme Being (Hypsistos) has a dis­
tinctly universalist character:
The sons of Ogyges call me Bacchus,
Egyptians think me Osiris,
Mysians name me Phanaces,
Indians regard me as Dionysus,
Roman rites make me Liber,
The Arab race thinks me Adoneus,
Lucaniacus the Universal God.
Ausonius, Epigrammata #48 (trans. White 1985)
This tradition of invoking the Highest God by the names given him by the 
various nations expresses a general conviction in late antiquity about the uni­
versality of religious truth and the relativity of religious institutions and de­
nominations and the conventionality of divine names. According to Servius, 
the Stoics taught that there is only one god, whose names merely differ accord­
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ing to actions and offices. Varro (116-27 bce), who knew about the Jews 
from Poseidonius, was unwilling to make any differentiation between Jove and 
YHWH because he was of the opinion that it mattered little by which name he 
was called as long as only the same thing was meant (“nihil interesse censens 
quo nomine nuncupetur, dum eadem res intelligatur”; Antiquitates rerum 
divinarum, frag. 16* Cardauns). Porphyry held the opinion that the names of 
the gods were purely conventional. Celsus argued that “it makes no difference 
whether one calls god ‘Supreme’ [Hypsistos] or Zeus or Adonai or Sabaoth or 
Ammon such as the Egyptians do or Papaios as the Scythians.” The name does 
not matter when it is evident what or who is meant.
In his treatise on Isis and Osiris, Plutarch brings this general conviction to 
the point, stating that no one would “regard the gods as different among dif­
ferent nations nor as barbarian and Greek and as southern and northern. But 
just as the sun, moon, heaven, earth, and sea are common to all, although they 
are given various names by the varying nations, so it is with the one reason [lo­
gos] which orders these things and the one providence which has charge of 
them” (On Isis and Osiris 67.377^3783). Seneca stressed that this conviction 
was based on natural evidence: “This All, which you see, which encompasses 
divine and human, is One, and we are but members of a great body.”
Revolutionary monotheism
Negative or counterreligion. Whereas evolutionary monotheism may be seen 
as the final stage of polytheism, there is no evolutionary line leading from poly­
theism to revolutionary monotheism. This form of monotheism manifests itself 
in the first place as a negative or counterreligion, defining what god is not and 
how god should not be worshiped. Revolutionary monotheism is based on the 
distinction between true and false, between one true god and the rest of forbid­
den, false, or nonexistent gods. The introduction of this distinction into the 
realm of religion constitutes a radical break. Polytheistic or “primary” reli­
gions generally are not concerned with questions of what to believe, but how 
to act. Not the truth of the beliefs but the correctness of the ritual perfor­
mances and recitations is what matters: orthopraxy instead of orthodoxy. No 
primary religion is concerned with the danger of worshiping “false” gods; their 
concern is, rather, not to neglect any gods requiring worship.
The first to establish a revolutionary monotheism was Akhenaten of Egypt 
(ca. 1360-1340 bce). Here, the negative energy of monotheism manifested 
itself not in explicit prohibitions (“No other gods! No images!”), but in practi­
cal destruction. The temples were closed, the cults abolished, the images de­
stroyed, the names erased. Akhenaten’s monotheism was based on a physical 
discovery: the sun was found to generate not only light and warmth, but also 
time. Light and time were held to be sufficient principles to explain the whole 
phenomenology of existence; the traditional pantheon was simply deemed 
superfluous. Its abolition was the logical consequence of a new cosmology. 
Akhenaten’s monotheism was a matter not of revelation but of natural evi­
dence. In this respect, it is closer to polytheism and to evolutionary monothe­
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ism than to revolutionary monotheism in its biblical and postbiblical manifes­
tations.
Biblical monotheism is based not on evidence but on revelation. It is not a 
matter of cognition but of commitment. It requires adherents to make a con­
scious decision to accept revealed truth and reject deceitful evidence. Natural 
evidence is debunked as seduction, as luring people away from revealed truth 
into the traps and pitfalls of the false gods, that is, the world. The distinction 
between true and false refers, in its ultimate meaning, to the distinction be­
tween god and world. Revolutionary monotheism worships an extramundane 
or transcendent god, whereas the deities of both polytheism and evolution­
ary monotheism create and animate the world from within and constitute its 
life. These religions may be termed “cosmotheism,” because they worship the 
world as a divine being. Biblical monotheism is based on an extramundane 
truth that cannot be seen or otherwise sensually experienced but only believed 
“with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your power,” and so is 
revolutionary as well.
The negative or antagonistic energy of revolutionary monotheism finds its 
expression, not perhaps in (f)actual history but in textual memory, in scenes 
of violence such as the story of the golden calf (when 3,000 men and women 
were cruelly executed), Elijah’s competition with the priests of Baal (when the 
priests were massacred), Josiah’s reform (when not only the “high places” 
[bamot] were destroyed but also the priests persecuted and killed), and the 
forced divorce under Ezra of Israelites married to Canaanites (which was a 
less bloody but equally violent act). This violence is not a matter of history but 
of semantics. However, there were always situations when textual semantics 
led to political action.
Canonization. Revealed truth that cannot be reexperienced in any natural 
way must be codified in order to be transmittable to future generations. Revo­
lutionary monotheism appeals to memory and transmission rather than to ob­
servation, attention, divination, and diligent maintenance. In order to transmit 
its revolutionary message beyond the first generations of founders and follow­
ers, it must develop a body of highly normative and canonized scripture. This 
applies to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as well as to Zoroastrianism, Bud­
dhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Confucianism, Daoism, and other religions of the 
East, all of which are based on a canon. The revolutionary break between 
cosmotheism and monotheism is everywhere dependent on the invention of 
writing. It is an “advance in intellectuality” as Freud called it, based on a new 
cultural technology.
The appeal to memory and the prohibition of forgetting usually assume the 
form of reading, learning, and interpreting. Remembering means a form of 
reactualization of the normative impulses as they are laid down in the canon. 
The texts have not only to be learned by heart but they have to be understood 
and followed. This implies both believing in the truth of what the texts say and 
the determination to organize the collective culture and the individual lifestyle 
according to the codified rules, laws, and norms of scripture.
Idolatry, sin, and the construction of paganism. In consequence of its deter­
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mination to distinguish between true and false, revolutionary monotheism 
constructs the outside world of former and foreign religions as paganism, a 
concept completely alien to primary religions. The Greeks knew “barbarians” 
but no “pagans.” However, the distinction is primarily applied within the 
group itself; it addresses the “pagan within” and cuts right through its own 
community and even through the individual heart, which now becomes the 
theater of inner conflicts and religious dynamics. The concept of idolatry be­
came psychologized and turned into a new concept of sin. Among the various 
innovations brought into the world by revolutionary monotheism, the inven­
tion of the “inner person” is of particular importance. Religion becomes a mat­
ter of the heart and soul: “The sacrifice acceptable to God is a broken spirit; a 
broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise” (Ps. 51.19 [ = 
51.17 Hebrew]). “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, 
and with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deut. 6.5).
The distinction between true and false religion has not only a cognitive, but 
also a moral meaning. In this early stage of monotheism, the “false gods” are 
conceived of as fully existent and powerful beings who constitute a constant 
temptation and lure the human heart into the pitfalls of idolatry. Idolatry is 
seen not only as an error but also as infidelity and immorality. Without the ex­
istence of other gods, the commandment to be faithful to the one god would 
have little meaning. The gods of polytheistic religions, in their need of social 
bonds, formed constellations within their own sphere and were not dependent 
on humanity. The god of the Bible is a “jealous god,” having to count on the 
love and loyalty of his chosen people, which inevitably fails in fulfilling his ex­
pectations. Thus, together with counterreligion, the concept of “sin” is born as 
the awareness of having failed in requiting God’s love and of having given in to 
the temptations of the false gods.
The theologization of justice. Revolutionary monotheism is a religion in 
which the idea of justice holds the central position. Whereas in polytheistic re­
ligions such as in Egypt, the spheres of cult and justice are carefully separated 
(justice is for humans, and cult is for the gods and the dead), in the Bible they 
are emphatically connected. God does not want sacrifice, but justice. Justice 
becomes the most prominent way of fulfilling the will of God. This led to the 
still widespread conviction that justice and morals were brought into the world 
only by monotheism and could not be maintained without it. The construction 
of paganism implies the idea of lawlessness and immorality. This is, of course, 
a polemical distortion. The gods, above all the sun-gods (Shamash in Mesopo­
tamia, Re in Egypt), watched over the keeping of the laws and acted as judges. 
In Egypt, moreover, there is the idea of a general judgment of the dead, which 
constitutes a first step toward a theologization of justice. But it is true that no 
god other than YHWH or Allah ever acted as legislator. The idea of justice is 
divine, but the formulation and promulgation of specific laws is the task of the 
king. In Egypt, the laws were never codified, and Mesopotamia had law books 
but no law codes. Every new king was free to promulgate his own laws and 
was not bound to an existing legislation. The Torah was the first attempt at
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creating a real law code not to be superseded by any future legislation. This 
was a revolutionary step by which the law—and with it religion itself, whose 
center the law constituted—became independent of any political government. 
The ideas of divine legislation, and not only codification but also revelation 
and canonization, are closely connected. The law formed the content of the Si­
nai revelation, and its codification in the various law codes in Exodus, Leviti­
cus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy formed the core of the evolving canon.
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